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STATEMENT OF JURSIDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-
2a-3(2)(h), and by Rules 3 and 4, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff and Appellant, Karen Wood, was married to Raymond D. Wood 
on the 31st day of August, 1973, and had two (2), children as issue of their marriage, Eric and 
Amanda. R.41-42. 
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The Woods purchased a home and real property during their marriage which was 
conveyed to them in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. R. 42. 58-59. 
Raymond Wood and Karen Wood were divorced April 14,1987. R. 33-34, 43, 
The Decree of Divorce awarded Raymond Wood the marital residence and real 
property to Raymond Wood "subject to the indebtedness thereon and awarded Karen Wood 
a Ten Thousand Dollar ($10,000.00), judgment against Raymond Wood, for her equity in the 
marital property. R. 32-34. 
The real property remained in joint tenancy following the divorce because 
Raymond Wood did not pay Karen Wood her equity in the marital property. R. 35-37, 43. On 
April 27,1997, Karen Wood and Raymond Wood, and their counsel, Michael A. Harrison and 
David M. Allred, respectively, entered into a Stipulation in the divorce action agreeing to the 
payment of the monies owed Ms. Wood and providing for her attorney, Michael Harrison, to 
deliver an executed quit claim deed to the home and real property when the monies owed her 
were paid in full by Raymond Wood. R. 21, 35-37. 
Raymond Wood married Colleen Wood on August 26,1998, in Carbon County, 
Utah. R. 20, 43. 
On July 17,2000, Raymond Wood committed suicide. R 21, 63-65. At the time 
of his death Raymond Wood had not paid Karen Wood the judgment for her equity in the real 
property and Michael Harrison had not delivered the quit claim deed to Raymond Wood. 
Karen Wood. R. 41-45, 63-65. 
On July 25,2000. Colleen Wood filed an Application for Informal Appointment 
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of Personal Representative and Determination of Intestacy in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court for Emery County. R. 1-3. 
On August 25, 2000, Karen Wood executed and recorded in the Office of the 
Emery County Recorder an Affidavit and Death Certificate as the surviving joint tenant of 
Raymond Wood, transferring the real property into her name alone. R. 64-65. 
On September 25, 2000, Colleen Wood was appointed as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Raymond D. Wood. R. 42-46. On December 18,2000, Colleen 
Wood filed in the probate court an Inventory which included the real property which was in 
joint tenancy between the deceased, Raymond Wood, and his survivor, Karen Wood. R. 49-50. 
The probate record has no proof that notice to creditors was given or published 
as required by U.C.A. Section 75-3-801. R. 1-176. 
On June 1, 2001, Colleen Wood as personal representative filed a motion and 
on June 14,2001, an order to show cause directing Karen Wood to appear before the probate 
court and show cause why her counsel, Michael A. Harrison, should not provide the "signed 
Deed of Reconveyance" to the personal representative's counsel and pay attorney fees. R. 62-
65. Karen Wood was served with the Order to Show Cause on June 6, 2001. R. 72-73. 
The trial court heard the personal representatives motion for order to show cause 
on June 19, 2001, and Karen Wood was present. R. 75. 
On July 9,2001, the personal representative Colleen Wood filed her Motion to 
Deny Creditor's Alleged Claim and her memorandum in support thereof R. 87-94. The 
unsworn memorandum claimed that a notice to creditors had been published in an Emery 
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County newspaper and that Karen Wood had not presented a creditor's claim to the personal 
representative within the period for presenting claims. R 87-94. There is no proof of 
publication in the probate court record of the publication of any notice to creditors as required 
by Utah Probate Code, Section 75-3-801. R 1-176. 
On July 17,2001, Karen Wood filed in the probate court a motion for leave to 
file a late memorandum requesting an extension of time to August 7, 2001. R 96. On July 23, 
2001, the attorney for the personal representative filed an objection to Karen Wood's request 
for an extension to employ counsel and file a memorandum in opposition to the motion to deny 
Karen Wood's creditor's claim. R 104-110. 
On July 26, 2001, Karen Wood filed an Objection and Response to Motion to 
Deny Creditor's Claim in the probate court asserting that she is not a creditor of the estate and 
that the notice to creditors did not apply to her because she is the sole owner of the real 
property and that it was not property of the estate. Paragraphs 4, and 5, refer to prior 
discussions about Karen Wood's claim to the real property between the estate's attorney, 
David Allred, and Karen Wood and her attorney Samuel Chiara on October 25, 2000. Karen 
Wood R 111-113. 
On August 10, 2001, the probate court denied Karen Wood's request for 
additional time to file an objection to the personal representative's Motion to Deny Creditor's 
Claim and stated that an objection had not been filed. R 114. The order also stated that the 
personal representative had filed a Notice ot All Creditors in the Emery County Progress and 
that Karen Wood had not filed a claim as required by U.C.A. 75-3-801(1), ordering that Karen 
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Wood's claim be denied and ordering Karen Wood have her counsel, Michael Harrison, release 
the "deed of trust," and awarding the personal representative attorney fees. R. 114-115. A 
Notice of Entry of Order was file on August 23, 2001, by counsel for the personal 
representative. R. 124-125. 
On September 17, 2001, new counsel for the personal representative, Colleen 
Wood, entered his appearance and on October 18,2001, new counsel for Karen Wood entered 
his appearance. R. 126-129. 
On October 18, 2001, Karen Wood filed her quiet title action against Colleen 
Wood individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Raymond D. Wood, asserting 
her ownership of the real property which was held in joint tenancy with Rayond Wood at the 
time of his death. R. 1-7, in the quiet title action, Seventh Judicial District Court case number 
010700169. 
On November 27, 2001, Colleen Wood individually and as personal 
representative filed her answer admitting her possession of the real property and asserting that 
the joint tenancy was terminated by a Decree of Divorce between Raymond Wood and Karen 
Wood, that Karen Wood's claim in the quiet title action had been adjudicated in the probate 
action and was barred by the doctrine ofres judicata, R. 12-15, in the quiet title action. 
On September 10, 2002, the personal representative filed a Motion to 
Consolidate the quiet title action with the probate action and moved to dismisss the quiet title 
action and for summary judgment. The motion and memorandum were not supported by 
affidavit The basis of the motion for summary judgment was that Karen Wood divorced from 
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Raymond Wood and thus not an heir of the estate, that the award of the real property in the 
divorce action rendered the quiet title claim res judicata, that the quiet title action was 
adjudicated in the divorce action which severed the joint tenancy in the real property rendering 
Karen Wood a creditor of the estate, and res judicata because the probate court had determined 
the "claim" by the probate court's denial of the "creditors claim" of Karen Wood. R. 16-40, 
in the quiet title action. The memorandum acknowledged that Raymond Wood had not paid 
Karen Wood the monies which were a condition precedent to the delivery of the Quit Claim 
Deed to Raymond Wood from Karen Wood's counsel, Michael Harrison. R. 27, in the quiet 
title action. The personal representative moved for consolidation of the quiet title action with 
the probate action because, "The parties in the Probate case are identical to the parties in this 
litigation [the quiet title action] and in the interest of judicial economy would dictate that the 
matters shold be consolidated." Attached to the motion for summary judgment were the 
Decree of Divorce entered by the Court on April 14,1987, and the Stipulation entered on April 
28, 1997, in the divorce action between Karen Wood and Raymond Wood. R. 32-37. 
On October 1, 2002, Karen Wood filed her sworn affidavit and memorandum 
of points and authorities in opposition to Colleen Wood's motion for consolidation and motion 
for summary judgment. She asserted in her affidavit that she and Raymond Wood had 
purchased the real property in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship and that the real 
property remained in joint tenancy following the divorce and that on April 28,1997, the Karen 
Wood, Raymond Wood and their respective counsel had intended and Stipulated in the divorce 
action that the real property remain in joint tenancy until Raymond Wood had fully paid Karen 
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Wood for her equity in the home. Karen Wood executed a quit claim deed which was to be 
held by her counsel, Michael A. Harrison, for delivery to Raymond Wood upon full payment 
of Karen Wood's equity in the home and real property in order to "intentionally to preserve 
and protect Karen Wood's interest in the home and real property." R. 41-45. 46-65,66-85. 
In her memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the personal 
representative's motion for summary judgment in the quiet title action Karen Wood agreed that 
because she and Raymond Wood were divorced that she was not an heir of his estate. She 
asserted that she was not a creditor of Raymond Wood's estate and that the probate court is 
without jurisdiction to hear or determine a suit to quiet tilte to the real property the personal 
representative was claiming belonged to Raymond Wood's estate, and thus was not res 
judicate and the probate action and the quiet title action could not be consolidated. R. 46-52. 
Karen Wood in opposition to the personal representatives motion for summary 
judgment disputed the personal representatives facts and argued that the divorce proceeding 
did not terminate nor sever the joint tenancy and the right of survivorship to the real property. 
R. 52. She asserted (at R. 43-44.), and argued (at R. 46-65.\ that the she and Raymond Wood 
had intended and agreed that the home and real property should remain in joint tenancy until 
she had been fully paid her equity therein and that the Quit Claim Deed held by her counsel, 
Michael Harrison, would not be delivered to Raymond Wood until he had paid Karen Wood 
in full for her interest in the marital residence and real property. 
She asserted that Raymond Wood the deceased had never paid her the monies 
he owed her and that he had commited suicide. R. 52-53. She asserted that the deed was never 
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delivered to Raymond Wood because he had not paid her the monies he owed her. R. 52-53. 
Karen Wood asserted that questions of disputed fact existed as to the intention 
of she and Raymond Wood upon the question of whether she was divested of her interest in 
her home and real property and cited in support of her contention the Stipulation in the divorce 
action that the quit claim deed would not be delivered to Raymond Wood until Karen Wood 
had been paid in full for her equity in the marital property. R. 52-65. Karen Wood also 
asserted that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment were fatally 
defective because there was no showing of the personal knowledge and competency of the 
affiant, Coleen Wood, to testify to the facts in the divorce action. R. 54-65. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented by this appeal are set forth below. The standard of review 
for each of the issues presented upon this appeal is a correction of error standard and that no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. A summary 
judgment presents for review conclusions of law only because by definition summary 
judgments do not resolve factual issues, and the appellate Court reviews the conslusions for 
correctness, without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
a. Whether the trial court properly concluded that Karen Wood is a creditor of 
the Estate of Raymond Wood? Preserved at R. 46-86, 70-72. 
b. Whether the probate court was without jurisdiction to determine Karen 
Wood's quiet title claim to her residence and real property? Preserved at R. 46-85, 70-72. 
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c. Whether the issue of Karen Wood's interest in her residence and real property 
was res judicata? Preserved at R. 16-40, 41-45, 66-7 5
 y 74-85. 
d. Whether the probate court had jurisdiction to determine the issues in a quiet 
title action? Preserved at R. 66-85. 
e. Whether the divorce proceeding severed the joint tenancy and the right of 
survivorship or specifically preserved the joint tenancy and survivorship to secure the payment 
of Karen Wood's equity to her? Preserved at R. 66-85. 
f Whether there was a disputed issue of material fact precluding the grant of 
summary judgment? Preserved at R 66-85. 
g. Whether the quiet title action should have been consolidated with the probate 
action? Preserved at R. 66-8 5. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts material to the consideration of the issues before this Honorable Court are: 
The Plaintiff and Appellant, Karen Wood, was married to Raymond D. Wood 
on the 31st day of August, 1973, and had two (2), children as issue of their marriage, Eric and 
Amanda. R.41-42. 
The Woods purchased a home and real property during their marriage which was 
conveyed to them in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. R. 42. 58-59. 
Raymond D. Wood and Karen Wood purchased a home during their marriage 
situate at 255 West 200 North, Orangeville, Utah. Copies of the two (2), Warranty Deeds by 
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which they acquired their interest m their home and real property were attached to Karen 
Wood's affidavit R 58-59. 
The Warranty Deed dated September 15,1986, from Donna L Gillis, to Karen 
Wood and Raymond D Wood, transferred and conveyed the real property to us "as joint 
tenants with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common " This warranty deed 
was recorded in the office of the Emery County Recorder on January 2,1987, as entry number 
315284, in book 165, at pages 198-199 R. 58. 
The Corrected Warranty Deed dated December 29,1986, from Melba R Shiner, 
to Karaen Wood and Raymond Darrell Wood, transferred and conveyed the real property to 
them, "as joint tenants " This Corrected Warranty Deed was recorded in the office of the 
Emery County Recorder on December 30,1986, as entry number 315275, in book 165, at page 
184 R. 59. 
Raymond Wood and Karen Wood were divorced April 14,1987 R. 33-34, 43. 
The Decree of Divorce awarded Raymond Wood the marital residence and real 
property to Raymond Wood "subject to the indebtedness thereon and awarded Karen Wood 
a Ten Thousand Dollar ($10,000 00), judgment against Raymond Wood, for her equity in the 
marital property R. 32-34. 
The real property remained in joint tenancy following the divorce because 
Raymond Wood did not pay Karen Wood her equity in the marital property R. 35-3 7, 43 On 
April 27,1997, Karen Wood and Raymond Wood, and their counsel, Michael A Harrison and 
David M Allred respectively, entered into a Stipulation m the divorce action agreeing to the 
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payment of the monies owed Ms. Wood and providing for her attorney, Michael Harrison, to 
deliver an executed quit claim deed to the home and real property when the monies owed her 
were paid in Ml by Raymond Wood. R. 21, 35-37. 
Raymond Wood married Colleen Wood on August 26,1998, in Carbon County, 
Utah. R. 20, 43. 
On July 17,2000, Raymond Wood committed suicide. R. 21, 63-65. At the time 
of his death Raymond Wood had not paid Karen Wood the judgment for her equity in the real 
property and Michael Harrison had not delivered the quit claim deed to Raymond Wood. 
Karen Wood. R. 41-45, 63-65. 
On July 25,2000. Colleen Wood filed an Application for Informal Appointment 
of Personal Representative and Determination of Intestacy in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court for Emery County. R. 1-3. 
On August 25, 2000, Karen Wood executed and recorded in the Office of the 
Emery County Recorder an Affidavit and Death Certificate as the surviving joint tenant of 
Raymond Wood, transferring the real property into her name alone. R. 64-65. 
On September 25, 2000, Colleen Wood was appointed as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Raymond D. Wood. R. 42-46. On December 18, 2000, Colleen 
Wood filed in the probate court an Inventory which included the real property which was in 
joint tenancy between the deceased, Raymond D. Wood, and his survivor, Karen Wood. R. 49-
50. 
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The probate record has no proof that notice to creditors was given or published 
as required by U.C.A. Section 75-3-801. R. 1-176. 
On June 1, 2001, Colleen Wood as personal representative filed a motion and 
on June 14,2001, an order to show cause directing Karen Wood to appear before the probate 
court and show cause why her counsel, Michael A. Harrison, should not provide the "signed 
Deed of Reconveyance" to the personal representative's counsel and pay attorney fees. R. 62-
65. Karen Wood was served with the Order to Show Cause on June 6,2001. R. 72-73. 
The trial court heard the personal representatives motion for order to show cause 
on June 19, 2001, and Karen Wood was present. R. 75. 
On July 9,2001, the personal representative Colleen Wood filed her Motion to 
Deny Creditor's Alleged Claim and her memorandum in support thereof. K 87-94. The 
unsworn memorandum claimed that a notice to creditors had been published in an Emery 
County newspaper and that Karen Wood had not presented a creditor's claim to the personal 
representative within the period for presenting claims. R. 87-94. There is no proof of 
publication in the probate court record of the publication of any notice to creditors as required 
by Utah Probate Code, Section 75-3-801. R. 1-176. 
On July 17, 2001, Karen Wood filed in the probate court a motion for leave to 
file a late memorandum requesting an extension of time to August 7,2001. R, 96. On July 23, 
2001, the attorney for the personal representative filed an objection to Karen Wood's request 
for an extension to employ counsel and file a memorandum in opposition to the motion to deny 
Karen Wood's creditor's claim. R. 104-110. 
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On July 26,2001, Karen Wood filed an Objection and Response to Motion to 
Deny Creditor's Claim in the probate court asserting that she is not a creditor of the estate and 
that the notice to creditors did not apply to her because she is the sole owner of the real 
property and that it was not property of the estate. Paragraphs 4, and 5, refer to prior 
discussions about Karen Wood's claim to the real property between the estate's attorney, 
David Allred, and Karen Wood and her attorney Samuel Chiara on October 25, 2000. Karen 
Wood R. 111-113. 
On August 10, 2001, the probate court denied Karen Wood's request for 
additional time to file an objection to the personal representative's Motion to Deny Creditor's 
Claim and stated that an objection had not been filed. R. 114. The order also stated that the 
personal representative had filed a Notice ot All Creditors in the Emery County Progress and 
that Karen Wood had not filed a claim as required by U.C. A. 75-3-801(1), ordering that Karen 
Wood's claim be denied and ordering Karen Wood have her counsel, Michael Harrison, release 
the "deed of trust," and awarding the personal representative attorney fees. R. 114-115. A 
Notice of Entry of Order was file on August 23, 2001, by counsel for the personal 
representative. R. 124-125. 
On September 17, 2001, new counsel for the personal representative, Colleen 
Wood, entered his appearance and on October 18,2001, new counsel for Karen Wood entered 
his appearance. R. 126-129. 
On October 18, 2001, Karen Wood filed her quiet title action against Colleen 
Wood individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Raymond D. Wood, asserting 
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her ownership of the real property which was held in joint tenancy with Rayond Wood at the 
time of his death R 1-7, in the quiet title action, Seventh Judicial District Court case number 
010700169. 
On November 27, 2001, Colleen Wood individually and as personal 
representative filed her answer admitting her possession of the real property and asserting that 
the joint tenancy was terminated by a Decree of Divorce between Raymond Wood and Karen 
Wood, that Karen Wood's claim in the quiet title action had been adjudicated in the probate 
action and was barred by the doctrine ofres judicata. R 12-15, in the quiet title action. 
On September 10, 2002, the personal representative filed a Motion to 
Consolidate the quiet title action with the probate action and moved to dismisss the quiet title 
action and for summary judgment. The motion and memorandum were not supported by 
affidavit The basis of the motion for summary judgment was that Karen Wood divorced from 
Raymond Wood and thus not an heir of the estate, that the award of the real property in the 
divorce action rendered the quiet title claim res judicata, that the quiet title action was 
adjudicated in the divorce action which severed the joint tenancy in the real property rendering 
Karen Wood a creditor of the estate, and res judicata because the probate court had determined 
the "claim" by the probate court's denial of the "creditors claim" of Karen Wood. R. 16-40, 
in the quiet title action. The memorandum acknowledged that Raymond Wood had not paid 
Karen Wood the monies which were a condition precedent to the delivery of the Quit Claim 
Deed to Raymond Wood from Karen Wood's counsel, Michael Harrison. R. 27, in the quiet 
title action. The personal representative moved for consolidation of the quiet title action with 
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the probate action because, "The parties in the Probate case are identical to the parties in this 
litigation [the quiet title action] and in the interest of judicial economy would dictate that the 
matters shold be consolidated." Attached to the motion for summary judgment were the 
Decree of Divorce entered by the Court on April 14,1987, and the Stipulation entered on April 
28,1997, in the divorce action between Karen Wood and Raymond Wood. R. 32-37. 
On October 1, 2002, Karen Wood filed her sworn affidavit and memorandum 
of points and authorities in opposition to Colleen Wood's motion for consolidation and motion 
for summary judgment. She asserted in her affidavit that she and Raymond Wood had 
purchased the real property in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship and that the real 
property remained in joint tenancy following the divorce and that on April 28,1997, the Karen 
Wood, Raymond Wood and their respective counsel had intended and Stipulated in the divorce 
action that the real property remain in joint tenancy until Raymond Wood had fully paid Karen 
Wood for her equity in the home. Karen Wood executed a quit claim deed which was to be 
held by her counsel, Michael A. Harrison, for delivery to Raymond Wood upon full payment 
of Karen Wood's equity in the home and real property in order to "intentionally to preserve 
and protect Karen Wood's interest in the home and real property." R. 41-45. 46-65,66-85. 
In her memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the personal 
representative's motion for summary judgment in the quiet title action Karen Wood agreed that 
because she and Raymond Wood were divorced that she was not an heir of his estate. She 
asserted that she was not a creditor of Raymond Wood's estate and that the probate court is 
without jurisdiction to hear or determine a suit to quiet tilte to the real property the personal 
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representative was claiming belonged to Raymond Wood's estate, and thus was not res 
judicate and that the probate action and the quiet title action could not be consolidated. R. 46-
52. 
Karen Wood in opposition to the personal representatives motion for summary 
judgment disputed the personal representatives facts and argued that the divorce proceeding 
did not terminate nor sever the joint tenancy and the right of survivorship to the real property. 
R. 52. She asserted (at R. 43-44.), and argued (at R. 46-65.\ that the she and Raymond Wood 
had intended and agreed that the home and real property should remain in joint tenancy until 
she had been fully paid her equity therein and that the Quit Claim Deed held by her counsel, 
Michael Harrison, would not be delivered to Raymond Wood until he had paid Karen Wood 
in full for her interest in the marital residence and real property. 
She asserted that Raymond Wood the deceased had never paid her the monies 
he owed her and that he had commited suicide. R. 52-53. She asserted that the deed was never 
delivered to Raymond Wood because he had not paid her the monies he owed her. R. 52-53. 
Karen Wood asserted that questions of disputed fact existed as to the intention 
of she and Raymond Wood upon the question of whether she was divested of her interest in 
her home and real property and cited in support of her contention the Stipulation in the divorce 
action that the quit claim deed would not be delivered to Raymond Wood until Karen Wood 
had been paid in Ml for her equity in the marital property. R. 52-65. Karen Wood also 
asserted that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment were fatally 
defective because there was no showing of the personal knowledge and competency of the 
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affiant, Coleen Wood, to testify to the facts in the divorce action. R. 54-65. 
The trial court in quiet title action granted the personal representatives motion 
for consolidation on January 22,2003. R 98. On January 22,2003, he probate court granted 
the personal representative's motion for summary judgment upon the basis that the decision 
in the probate matter is res judicata upon the issues raised in Karen Wood's quiet title action. 
The probate court ruled that Karen Wood became a creditor of Raymond Wood when she 
agreed to a sum certain in the divorce action and that "All of her rights, title or interest, in the 
property were modified from a property interest to a secured creditor's interest." The probate 
court then ruled that Karen Wood "failed to timely perfect a creditor's claim [which] now 
prevents her from seeking to do indirectly what she was prevented from doing directly." The 
probate Court granted the personal representative's motion for summary judgment and 
dismissed the quiet title action of Karen Wood. R. 100-102. 
Karen Wood filed her Notice of Appeal on February 18,2003. R. 103-104. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Utah Probate Code, Section 75-1-201(6), in defining a creditor's claim 
states "Claims" does not include ... demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent... to 
specific assets alleged to be included in the estate. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in In re Estate ofMalliet, 649 P.2d 18,19 (Utah 
1982), that a "creditor's claim" does not involve 'demands or disputes regarding the tilte of 
a decedent... to specific assets.5 
Thus, Karen Wood's assertion of her right to quiet title to the residence and real 
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property which she held in joint tenancy at the time of the death of Raymond Wood was not 
a "claim" of a creditor. Indeed, Karen Wood asserted that she was not a creditor in the estate 
action but asserted that she owned the real property by virtue of the joint tenancy which, by 
operation of law, transferred the real property to her upon the death of Raymond Wood. The 
summary judgment of the trial court finding that Karen Wood was a creditor of the estate of 
Raymond Wood had had not timely perfected her "creditor's claim" should be reversed. 
The probate court was without jurisdiction to determine the right of Karen Wood 
in her marital residence and real property and thus, because the claim could not be raised in the 
probate court, it is not res judicata and this action could not be consolidated with the probate 
proceeding as was requested by the Defendant personal representative and Appellee below. 
Thus, the summary judgment of the trial court that Karen Wood's quiet title action was a 
previously adjudicated creditor's claim, which she did not perfect within the statutory three 
month period and thus was res judicata, in the quiet title action should be reversed. 
The divorce of Raymond Wood and Karen Wood did not sever nor terminate the 
joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in the marital residence and real property because 
the parties thereto and their counsel has specifically agreed in the divorce Stipulation that the 
deed would not be delivered to Raymond Wood until Karen Wood was paid in ML 
The Utah Probate Code, Section 75-2-804(2), provides that "Except as provided 
by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the 
division of the marital estate... the divorce...," severs the interests of the former spouses in 
property held by them at the time of the divorce ...as joint tenants. 
18 
The marital home and real property of the Plaintiff, Karen Wood, and her former 
husband, Raymond Wood, remained in the names of both parties "as joint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common," until the death of Raymond Wood. At 
the time of Raymond Wood's death the marital home and real property became the sole and 
exclusive property of Karen Wood, because she held the right of survivorship pursuant to the 
Stipulation of Raymond Wood, Karen Wood and their respective counsel in the divorce action. 
The Stipulation in the divorce action requiring Michael Harrison, counsel for Karen Wood, to 
not deliver the deed to Raymond Wood until Karen Wood was paid in full excepted the 
severance of the joint tenancy upon the divorce as provided in the statute. The Plaintiff in the 
quiet title action, Karen Wood, should have been granted summary judgment and declared to 
be the sole, undisputed owner of the subject marital residence and real property because the 
real property transferred to her by operation of law upon the death of Raymond Wood. 
Rule 56(e), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that affidavits made 
in support of a motion for summary judgment shall be made upon the personal knowledge of 
the affiant, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify as to the matters set forth therein. 
The affidavits of the Defendant personal representative, offered in support of her 
motion for summary judgment, were fatally defective. The personal representative did not 
made and there was no showing that the affidavits are based upon the personal knowledge of 
the affiant personal representative. A supporting affidavit must be based upon the affiant's 
personal knowledge, and an affidavit based merely on unsubstantiated opinions and beliefs is 
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insufficient Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). The personal representative's 
affidavits were wholly insufficient because they are not based upon her personal knowledge 
and do not demonstrate her competence to testify as to the facts she asserts therein. 
A motion for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents 
a genuine issue of material fact which if resolved in the favor of the nonmoving party, would 
entitle him to judgment as a matter of law. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). In 
this action, Karen Wood asserted that it was the intention of Raymond Wood, and his counsel, 
she and her counsel, Michael Harrison, that the real property would remain in joint tenancy 
with the right of survivorship until Karen Wood had been fully paid the monies Raymond 
Wood owed her from the marital estate. Resolving this fact in favor of Karen Wood, the 
nonmoving party, Karen Wood would be entitled to summary judgment quieting the title in 
the real property in her. Karen Wood asserted her and Raymond Wood's intention to keep the 
real property in joint tenancy. The Stipulation in the divorce case supported her assertion 
because it made delivery of the quit claim deed by Michael Harrison to Raymond Wood upon 
fuU payment of monies owed the operative action which would sever the joint tenancy. It was 
undisputed by the personal representative that Raymond Wood had not paid Karen Wood. It 
was undisputed that Michael Harrison did not deliver the deed to Raymond Wood prior to his 
death. It was undisputed that Karen Wood believed the real property to be hers upon the death 
of Raymond Wood and transferred the real property into her sole name following his death. 
Karen Woods assertion that she and Raymond Wood, and their respective counsel in the 
divorce action, intended for the real property to remain in joint tenancy until she was paid in 
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Mi was undisputed in the record. Accepting these facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party or the losing party, here Karen Wood, the probate court was precluded from 
entering summary judgment against Karen Wood in the quiet title action. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT AN HEIR OF THE ESTATE NOR 
IS SHE A CREDITOR OF THE ESTATE OF RAYMOND WOOD 
The personal representative's argument in the proceedings below was essentially 
that the Plaintiff, Karen Wood, and Raymond Wood, were divorced by the trial Court in April, 
1987, and thus Karen Wood was not entitled to inherit from the Raymond Wood estate but is 
a creditor of the estate. The personal representative also claimed that the issue is res judicata 
because the probate court denied Karen Wood's "creditor's claim." 
Karen Wood assert in her complaint in the quiet title action and in the probate 
proceeding that title to her marital residence and real property should be quieted in her. She 
asserted that she did not stand in the position of a creditor in the estate proceeding. Moreover, 
there was not proof of publication of a notice to creditors in the probate court's record. Harris 
v. Turner, 85 P.2d 824 (Utah 1938). The first notice to Karen Wood that the personal 
representative was seeking the title to the real property held in joint tenancy until Raymond 
Wood's death (whereupon it transferred to Karen Wood by operation of law R. 64-65.\ was 
on June 6, 2001, when the personal representative sought to compel her to deliver the quit 
claim deed held by Michael Harrison, long after the three month period for filing claims had 
expired. R. 1-70. There is evidence in the probate court's file that the personal representative 
21 
and her counsel knew that Karen Wood claimed ownership of the real property. K 111-112. 
The Utah Probate Code, Section 75-1-201(6), in defining a creditor's claim 
states "Claims" does not include ... demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent... to 
specific assets alleged to be included in the estate. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in In re Estate ofMalliet, 649 P.2d 18,19 (Utah 
1982), that a "creditor's claim" does not involve 'demands or disputes regarding the tilte of 
a decedent... to specific assets.5 
Thus, Karen Wood's assertion of her right to quiet title to the residence and real 
property which she held in joint tenancy at the time of the death of Raymond Wood was not 
a "claim" of a creditor. Indeed, Karen Wood asserted that she was not a creditor in the estate 
action but asserted that she owned the real property by virtue of the joint tenancy which, by 
operation of law, transferred the real property to her upon the death of Raymond Wood. The 
summary judgment of the trial court finding that Karen Wood was a creditor of the estate of 
Raymond Wood had had not timely perfected her "creditor's claim" should be reversed. 
THE PROBATE COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO 
DETERMINE THE KAREN WOOD'S CLAIM TO REAL PROPERTY 
AND THE QUIET TITLE ACTION WAS NOT RES JUDICATA 
NOR COULD IT BE CONSOLIDATED WITH THE PROBATE ACTION 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals, in a long-standing line 
of cases, has determined that a probate Court is without jurisdiction to hear or determine a suit 
to quiet title to real property claimed to belong to an estate, and that the dispute cannot be 
resolved by filing and processing a claim against the estate under the Uniform Probate Code. 
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In Re Rogers' Estate, 75 Utah 290, 284 P. 992 (Utah 1930) (The probate court is without 
jurisdiction to hear a suit by a stranger to the probate action to quiet title to property claimed 
to belong to the estate.); Rogers v. West, 82 Utah 525, 25 P.2d 971 (Utah 1933Xthe probate 
court had no jurisdiction to determine an adminixtratix sought to cancel a contract between the 
deceased and a third party who sought specific performance.); In re Estate ofMalliet, 649 P.2d 
18 (Utah 1982). See also: In re Estate ofShepley, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982); Bradshaw v. 
McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982); and In re Estate of Sharp, 537 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975). 
The probate court was without jurisdiction to determine the right of Karen Wood 
in her marital residence and real property and thus, because the claim could not be raised in the 
probate court, it is not res judicata and this action could not be consolidated with the probate 
proceeding as was requested by the Defendant personal representative and Appellee below. 
Thus, the summary judgment of the trial court that Karen Wood's quiet title action was a 
previously adjudicated creditor's claim, which she did not perfect within the statutory three 
month period and thus was res judicata, in the quiet title action should be reversed. 
THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING DID NOT SEVER THE 
JOINT TENANCY AND THE RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP 
BUT SPECIFICALLY PRESERVED IT 
The personal representative and Appellee argued upon her motion for summary 
judgment that the divorce proceeding severed and terminated the parties joint tenancy and the 
right of survivorship in the real property. The Plaintiff and Appellant, Karen Wood, in her 
affidavit filed in opposition to the Appellee's motion for summary judgment in the trial court, 
disputed the personal representative's facts and claims and offered proof to the contrary. On 
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April 25, 1997, Raymond Wood and Karen Wood, and their respective counsel, entered into 
a written Stipulation in the divorce action. Pursuant to the written stipulation the real property 
was to remain in joint tenancy until Raymond Wood paid Karen Wood in Ml for her interest 
in her marital residence and real property. A quit claim deed was placed with Karen Wood's 
counsel, Michael A. Harrison, to be delivered to Raymond Wood upon the payment of all sums 
due under the Stipulation. Stipulation paragraph 3, The parties to the divorce, Karen Wood 
and Raymond Wood, and their respective counsel, intentionally kept the marital residence and 
real property in joint tenancy to secure the payment of Karen Wood's equity to her. Raymond 
Wood, now deceased, never paid Karen Wood the monies for her share of the marital residence 
and real property. In July, 2000, Raymond Wood committed suicide because the Defendant, 
Colleen (Wood) Davis was divorcing him. The quit claim deed was never delivered to 
Raymond Wood because he did not pay all sums due Karen Wood as had been stipulated to 
in the divorce action. 
The Utah Probate Code, Section 75-2-804(2)(b), provides: 
Except as provided by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract 
relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or 
after the marriage, divorce, or annulment, the divorce or annulment of a marriage: 
(b) severs the interests of the former spouses in property held by them at the time of the divorce 
or annulment as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, transforming the interests of the 
former spouses into tenancies in common. 
The personal representative argued in the trial court that the divorce between 
Karen Wood and Raymond Wood severed and terminated the joint tenancy in the real property 
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citing to the trial court the statute quoted above. Karen wood argued in the trial court that even 
though she had been awarded a money judgment for her equity in the marital residence and real 
property in the divorce action that the property remained in joint tenancy with the right of 
survivorship because she and Raymond Wood and their respective counsel in the divorce 
action had intended and kept the real property in joint tenancy specifically to preserve and 
protect her interest therein. Karen Wood offered in support of her position a Stipulation in the 
divorce action which provided that a quit claim deed to the real property would be delivered 
to Raymond Wood by Michael Harrison, Karen Wood's counsel, upon the full payment of the 
monies owed to Karen Wood. The full payment of the marital estate monies owed to Karen 
Wood was the trigger for the delivery of the deed by her counsel by Michael Harrison to 
Raymond Wood. Karen Wood and Raymond Wood, and their respective counsel intended that 
the joint tenancy would be severed and terminated only when Mr. Harrison delivered the deed 
to Raymond Wood, and upon his full payment of the monies he owed to Karen Wood. 
Raymond Wood, at the time of his death, had not paid the monies he owed to 
Karen Wood. Michael Harrison had not delivered the quit claim deed to Raymond Wood 
because he had not paid the money to Karen Wood that he owed her from the marital estate. 
A deed, to be operative as a transfer of ownership of land, or an interest or estate therein, must 
be delivered. Wiggill v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1979). The deed could not be delivered 
after Raymond Wood's death, and if it had been it would not convey title to the property, or 
any part thereof. Id. The main object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the 
parties, especially that of the grantor. Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979). In the 
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present action the grantor, Karen Wood, did not intend to deliver the quit claim deed to 
Raymond Wood until he had paid her for her equity in her marital residence and real property 
and the deed was never delivered to Raymond Wood because he had not paid Karen for her 
interest in the home. Delivery of a deed, or the absence of delivery is a question of fact. 
Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984). In the instant case, the facts are undisputed as 
to the intention of both Raymond Wood and Karen Wood in the divorce action upon the 
question of whether the Plaintiff was divested of her interest in the real property and her home. 
Both Karen Wood and Raymond Wood, and their respective counsel, had stipulated in the 
divorce action that the home and real property would remain in joint tenancy until, and the quit 
claim deed would be delivered to Mr. Wood, only after Raymond Wood fully paid for Karen 
Wood's interest in the home. 
The quit claim deed was prepared by the parties and their counsel, signed by 
Karen Wood, for delivery to Raymond Wood upon his full payment of Karen Wood's equity 
in the home. The parties to the divorce and their counsel intentionally preserved Mrs. Karen 
Wood's joint tenancy and the right of survivorship to ensure the payment of her interest in her 
marital residence. Raymond Wood did not pay Karen Wood her equity in the marital 
residence and when he died without having paid her equity, the home and real property passed 
to Karen Wood as the joint tenant. The Plaintiff did not deliver the quit claim deed because 
she had not been paid for her equity. Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594 (Utah 1979); Poulsen v. 
Paulsen, 672 P.2d 97 (Utah 1983). 
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The divorce of Raymond Wood and Karen Wood did not sever nor terminate the 
joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in the marital residence and real property because 
the parties thereto and their counsel has specifically agreed in the divorce Stipulation that the 
deed would not be delivered to Raymond Wood until Karen Wood was paid in full. 
The Utah Probate Code, Section 75-2-804(2), provides that "Except as provided 
by the express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the 
division of the marital estate... the divorce...," severs the interests of the former spouses in 
property held by them at the time of the divorce ...as joint tenants. 
The marital home and real property of the Plaintiff, Karen Wood, and her former 
husband, Raymond Wood, remained in the names of both parties "as joint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common," until the death of Raymond Wood. At 
the time of Raymond Wood's death the marital home and real property became the sole and 
exclusive property of Karen Wood, because she held the right of survivorship pursuant to the 
Stipulation of Raymond Wood, Karen Wood and their respective counsel in the divorce action. 
The Stipulation in the divorce action requiring Michael Harrison, counsel for Karen Wood, to 
not deliver the deed to Raymond Wood until Karen Wood was paid in full excepted the 
severance of the joint tenancy upon the divorce as provided in the statute. The Plaintiff in the 
quiet title action, Karen Wood, should have been granted summary judgment and declared to 
be the sole, undisputed owner of the subject marital residence and real property because the 
real property transferred to her by operation of law upon the death of Raymond Wood. 
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THE DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVITS ARE DEFECTIVE 
BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT MADE UPON HER PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
Rule 56(e), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that affidavits made 
in support of a motion for summary judgment shall be made upon the personal knowledge of 
the affiant, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify as to the matters set forth therein. 
The affidavits of the Defendant personal representative, offered in support of her 
motion for summary judgment, were fatally defective. The personal representative did not 
made and there was no showing that the affidavits are based upon the personal knowledge of 
the affiant personal representative. A supporting affidavit must be based upon the affiant's 
personal knowledge, and an affidavit based merely on unsubstantiated opinions and beliefs is 
insufficient. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). The personal representative's 
affidavits were wholly insufficient because they are not based upon her personal knowledge 
and do not demonstrate her competence to testify as to the facts she asserts therein. The 
personal representative was not a party to the divorce action, nor did she assert personal 
knowledge of the facts in the divorce action giving rise to her argument that she should be 
awarded by summary judgment and the home and real property of the Plaintiff, Karen Wood. 
The personal representative cannot be competent to testify as to the facts of the divorce 
between the Plaintiff and Raymond Wood. She was not present to personally observe the 
proceedings nor was she a party to the divorce action. The affidavits of the personal 
representative are fatally defective and the summary judgment should be reversed. 
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THE FACTS AS TO THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES 
TO THE DIVORCE ACTION WERE DISPUTED AND THE 
PROBATE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST KAREN WOOD 
A motion for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents 
a genuine issue of material fact which if resolved in the favor of the nonmoving party, would 
entitle him to judgment as a matter of law. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). In 
this action, Karen Wood asserted that it was the intention of Raymond Wood, and his counsel, 
she and her counsel, Michael Harrison, that the real property would remain in joint tenancy 
with the right of survivorship until Karen Wood had been fully paid the monies Raymond 
Wood owed her from the marital estate. Resolving this fact in favor of Karen Wood, the 
nonmoving party, Karen Wood would be entitled to summary judgment quieting the title in 
the real property in her. Karen Wood asserted her and Raymond Wood's intention to keep the 
real property in joint tenancy. The Stipulation in the divorce case supported her assertion 
because it made delivery of the quit claim deed by Michael Harrison to Raymond Wood upon 
full payment of monies owed the operative action which would sever the joint tenancy. It was 
undisputed by the personal representative that Raymond Wood had not paid Karen Wood. It 
was undisputed that Michael Harrison did not deliver the deed to Raymond Wood prior to his 
death. It was undisputed that Karen Wood believed the real property to be hers upon the death 
of Raymond Wood and transferred the real property into her sole name following his death. 
Karen Woods assertion that she and Raymond Wood, and their respective counsel in the 
divorce action, intended for the real property to remain in joint tenancy until she was paid in 
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full was undisputed in the record. Accepting these facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party or the losing party, here Karen Wood, the probate court was precluded from 
entering summary judgment against Karen Wood in the quiet title action. Summary judgment 
is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County
 y 805 
P.2d 789 (Utah Ct App. 1991). Here the intentions of Raymond Wood and Karen Wood and 
their counsel in the divorce action in entering into the Stipulation for Michael Harrison to hold 
the quit claim deed for delivery to Raymond Wood only upon full payment to Karen Wood of 
the monies owed her from the marital estate was a question of fact and the personal 
representative was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
The probate court's grant of summary judgment against Karen Wood and the 
dismissal of her quiet title action should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Karen Wood was not a creditor of the Estate of Raymond D. Wood and the quiet 
title action was not res judicated because of the divorce action nor because of the probate 
court's denial of a so called "creditor's claim" of Karen Wood. The divorce proceeding did 
not sever nor terminate the joint tenancy and her right of survivorship in the marital residence 
and real property but specifically protected and preserved it. 
The probate court was without jurisdiction to resolve the issues in the quiet title 
action of Karen Wood to real property claimed by the estate. Thus, the quiet title action could 
not be consolidated with the probate action and the quiet title action was not res judicata. 
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The personal representative's motions for summary judgment and for 
consolidation with the probate action should have been denied. The Plaintiff, Karen Wood, 
should have been awarded summary judgment in her favor and this Honorable Court should 
declare the Karen Wood's marital home and real property her sole and exclusive property 
because she was a joint tenant with the full right of survivorship at the time of Raymond 
Wood's death. 
The Appellant, Karen Wood, should be awarded her attorney fees incurred 
defending the personal representative's frivolous motion for summary judgment, for 
consolidation and upon this appeal. The affidavits of the Defendant do not comply with the 
mandatory requirements of Rule 56(e), and are fatally defective. The facts regarding the 
intentions of Raymond Wood, Karen Wood and their counsel in the divorce action were 
disputed. The summary judgment of the probate court should be reversed. The Plaintiff, 
Karen Wood, should be awarded her real property and her attorney fees and costs incurred 
herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITT^p this 11th day of Novfember, 2003. 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR3<. 
Attorney for Appellant, / X 
Ms. Karen Wood ( \ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of November, 2003,1 served upon and 
mailed, postage prepaid and by first class mail, two (2), true and correct copies of the foregoing 
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Brief Of Appellant to Michael K. Black, AttomevJop-Gelte^fWood) Davis and the Estate of 
Raymond D. Wood, at 39 West 300 North, Pr/Wo, Utah 84601> 
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ADDENDUM 
A. RULING ON MOTON TO CONSOLIDATE filed in the trial court on January 22,2003. 
B. ORDER OF DISMISSAL filed in the probate action on January 22, 2003. 
FILED 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AI 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH/ 
KAREN WOOD 
vs 
COLLEEN WOOD 
Plaintiff 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
CONSOLIDATE 
) Case No 010700169 
Defendant ) Judge BryceK Bryner 
The Motion to Consolidate the above entitled case with Probate No 00370013EI is granted 
in order to maintain consistency The Motion for Summary Judgment shall be ruled on by the 
Hon Bruce K Halliday, Judge of the Seventy District Court, who is hearing the said probate 
case 
DATED this 19th day of December, 2002 
~> 
{C Js*fGg_ 
B/yce K Bryner, Judg? 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010700169 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail ANDREW B. BERRY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
62 WEST MAIN STREET 
P. O. BOX 600 
MORONI, UT 84646-0000 
Mail MICHAEL K BLACK 
ATTORNEY DEF 
101 East 200 South 
Springville UT 84663 
Dated this ~22^ day of d ""\/?,<"•, < 20^3 
sLsWKJf—i 
Court Clerk 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN) 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAj 
KAREN WOOD, 
vs. 
COLLEEN WOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant 
ORDER OF DTSM 
Case No. 010700169 
Judge Bruce K. Hall id ay 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner has ordered this case #010700169, hereafter #169, consolidated with 
probate case #00370013, hereafter #13, and has requested that the judge handling the latter case, in 
an attempt to expedite efficient handling of the cases, rule on defendant's Motion For Summary 
Judgement in case #169. The Court has reviewed the pleadings, reviewed the decision which it made 
in the probate matter, and concludes that the Motion For Summary Judgement on the grounds of the 
decision in the probate matter was and is res judicata as to the ultimate issues raised in plaintiff's 
Petition to Quiet Title should be granted. I conclude that case #169 is merely an effort on the part 
of the plaintiffto circumvent the order in case #13 and avoid the operation of the statute of limitations 
question which underlies the decision in the probate matter. To allow such an effort would be a 
contravention of equity and justice herein 
The Court previously concluded that the claim made by Karen Wood in # 13 was untimely and 
denied that creditors claim. That decision is hereby confirmed and I conclude that the claim to Quiet 
Title in #169 is merely an effort to avoid my original ruling and reactivate the creditor's claim based 
upon the original and/or modified divorce decree. 
The Court concludes that the ex wife, Karen Wood, became a creditor of the decedent when 
she agreed to the sums certain in the divorce action. All of her rights, title or interest, in the property 
were modified from a property interest to a secured creditor's interest. The statute of limitations in 
the probate matter, where she failed to timely perfect a creditor's claim now prevents her from 
seeking to do indirectly what she was prevented from doing directly The mere fact that the creditor's 
f A t\ 
agent has or has not delivered the deed to the property to the deceased prior to the beginning of this 
law suit and/or the filing of a claim in the probate matter is a matter of the plaintiffs security interest 
and does not affect the statute of limitations problem which plaintiff, Karen Wood, has m this matter 
and in the probate matter which she cannot circumvent 
For the foregoing reasons the Court grants the Motion For Summary Judgement and orders 
the Claim to Quiet Title in this case #010700169 be, and the same is HEREBY DISMISSED 
Dated this /J& day of January, 2003 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010700169 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Dated this 22-' 4 
Mail 
Mail 
day of 
ANDREW B. BERRY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
62 WEST MAIN STREET 
P. 0. BOX 600 
MORONI, UT 84646-0000 
MICHAEL K BLACK 
ATTORNEY DEF 
101 East 200 South 
Springville UT 84663 
20 I~£S . 
/0U~_ 
Court Clerk 
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